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ABSTRACT
Normative systems accommodate temporary norms of several types,
which can also be modi￿ed in di￿erent, and codi￿ed ways. In this
paper we address the problem of modifying temporary norms that
are represented by means of the combination of two known for-
malisms in the current literature. The framework evolves from a
known one, which provides a system of norms at two distinct layers,
and represents changes at the two layers as means to provide room
for the codi￿ed change types. This results in four novel operators
that anticipate and extend norms in two di￿erent combined ways,
by preserving or not the e￿ects of the norms in the period of time
generated by the temporal modi￿cations. We study these new op-
erators and show how they relate to the operators of annulment
and abrogation analysed elsewhere.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Applied computing → Law; • Theory of computation →
Logic;
KEYWORDS
Norm changemodelling, Temporal Defeasible Logic, Representation
of temporary norms
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION
The topic of norm change in the law has been extensively stud-
ied from theoretical viewpoint (starting from fundamental contri-
butions such as Kelsen’s [28] and Hart’s [25], see also [31, 42])—
by mainly considering the structural and general aspects of legal
dynamics—and from the formal standpoint (see, e.g., [1–4, 9, 10,
27, 39, 43])— where much attention has been paid on theory revi-
sion techniques which abstract from any temporal consideration: a
rather comprehensive and recent overview on norm change and
lawmaking can be found in [7]. Some interesting studies have been
developed, too, in multi-agent systems (see [40]). However, despite
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
some e￿orts to introduce temporal reasoning and parameters in
the law (among the ￿rst attempts in the literature of AI&Law, see,
e.g., [30]), almost no e￿ort has been devoted to explore—from a
formal viewpoint—temporal aspects of explicit legal changes, i.e.,
those changes that are implemented through explicit modi￿cations,
namely, through norms which change other norms. To the best of
our knowledge, the main contribution to this issue is still due only
to Governatori and Rotolo (see, in particular, [21], which o￿ers the
fundamental machinery).
In many other ￿elds the problems related to norm change have
been dealt with, and in particular legal theorists pointed out many
aspects of speci￿c forms of norm dynamics [36, 38, 41] and dealt
with problems related to the ways in which the norms change
depending on their authoritative source and on the nature of change
[12, 23, 26].
Governatori and Rotolo [21] worked on the problem of changing
norms by means of a formalism that is based on two layers: meta-
rules are used to represent norm-making mechanisms that are
allowed in a given legal system, and rules to represent norms by
themselves. This approach signi￿cantly di￿ers from those inspired
by Alchourrón et al.’s work on AGM-like theory revision [2], which
are focused on the dynamics of obligations and permissions.
Many other investigations [18, 19, 22] provided an analysis of
the possible ways in which norms can change.
Although these investigations have been focusing on the main
aspects of legal changes, which is still one underdeveloped point,
they do not consider temporary norms, which have also been dealt
with per se in the current literature of AI & Law, but have not been
studied as object of modi￿cations.
Generally speaking, modi￿cations can be either explicit or im-
plicit. In the ￿rst case, the law introduces norms whose peculiar
objective is to change the system by specifying what and how other
existing norms should be modi￿ed. In the second case, the legal
system is revised by introducing new norms which are not speci￿-
cally meant to modify previous norms, but which change in fact
the system because they are incompatible with such existing norms
and prevail over them.
Some recent investigations have worked on problems related to
ways in which changes in defeasible theories can be performed [15,
17, 34]. These studies, however, do not cover the explicit temporal
knowledge aspect.
Norms are temporary when they have a pre-de￿nite temporal
extension, namely when they are issued with attached an expiration
date, e.g. a date after which the legal provision will cease to be
e￿ective.
Norms treated by Governatori and Rotolo [21] do not possess
temporal constraints regarding their expiration, whilst, in fact,
many norms do have these kinds of properties. Norms with tempo-
ral constraints are named here temporary, where the name refers to
the notion of temporal validity as the temporal interval in which a
norm is applied, while the issuing time is the instant of the temporal
axis in which the norm is issued. In this paper we make a very sim-
ple assumption on the relationship between the above mentioned
temporal properties, which allows us to classify a wide variety of
temporary norms, and consequently many forms of modi￿cations.
Although the investigation which we base our work upon is
rather complete in embedding the above de￿ned modi￿cations,
there is one class of laws, and a corresponding class of modi￿ca-
tions, that can only exist when we add explicit validity expiration
time to the norms themselves. The major operations described in
previous work [21] are annulment and abrogation. In this paper we
prove that, by modifying the two layers in a slight way we can add
a rather relevant expressive power to the formalism that, besides
basic annulments and abrogations, accommodates temporal exten-
sions and temporal anticipations, which both act on the temporal
extension of a norm.
Governatori and Rotolo [21] dealt with norms that are issued at
a given instant of time and persist onward. Facts of the world are
derived in reality that can contrast with a norm at the instant in
which they are derived. A norm is retroactive when time is men-
tioned explicitly in the norm itself in such a way that it covers
derivability of facts in the past with respect to the issuing time. The
derivation of facts that are consistent with a norm can be regarded
as a form of compliance analysis, since the extension of the set of
facts that are consistent is the complement of the violations. A norm
has, therefore, a validity time, which is issued in the norm itself,
and can be limited to some e￿ects that are mentioned explicitly.
When the e￿ects of a norm are limited to an interval of time that is
terminating in the future we say that the norm is temporary. Notice
that when a norm acts in the past retroactively, we can assimilate
this speci￿c behaviour to regular norms with explicit time.
Within the limits of this investigation we can drive a new variant
of the logic machinery for annulment and abrogation of norms [21],
in order to understand the ways to codify changes to temporary
norms. In fact, we have two distinct aspects of a norm in its issuing
time: validity and e￿ects. A norm is valid, in general, since its
issuing time, whilst its e￿ects can apply either in the past or in the
future of that instant. Clearly, when we consider the moment in
which a norm is suppressed, we can have di￿erent scenarios, thus
giving rise to di￿erent suppression methods. First of all, in general,
a norm can be annulled or abrogated. As referred to temporary
norms, instead, we have:
• The norm terminates its validity interval;
• The norm is explicitly anticipated;
• The norm is explicitly extended;
• The norm is postponed.
When a norm is temporary, the two latter modi￿cations are
allowed, di￿erently from the former operations that are possible
for every type of norm, but with completely di￿erent e￿ects from
temporary to persistent norms.
Essentially, an annulment is a repeal, as it makes a norm invalid
and removes it from the legal system. The norm is suppressed in
a potentially retroactive way, namely it is not valid since a time
preceding the time of the suppression (typically, since the very mo-
ment when the norm was enacted). This can happen for an explicit
act of suppression, which can be either an act of the same issuing
authority, or an act of a superior authority, or can be revoked, due to
the violation of some principles of the law: the norm that is issued
con￿icts with other norms that are fundamental and unmodi￿able.
This can also occur because of a procedural nature, i.e. the norm
issuing act is per se illegal or con￿ictual.
The modi￿cation called abrogation consists in suppressing only
the e￿ects, and it is usually not retroactive. However, abrogations
are rather cumbersome with respect to temporary norms. Usually
abrogations operate ex nunc and so do not cancel the e￿ects that
were obtained before the modi￿cation. If so, it seems that abroga-
tions cannot operate retroactively besides speci￿c cases. However,
for temporary norms, an abrogation can be issued after the end of
the temporal validity, and this can also be the case for annulment,
though this case can be treated more easily. On the same time,
there is a case of abrogation that is di￿cult to distinguish from
annulment as it consists in suppressing the norm since its initial
application. In this case, we have that the norm has no temporal
validity but its e￿ects can still be in act. This case, also known as
leading to ghost norms, can occur as well for temporary norms.
There exist several examples of this kind of abrogations. For
instance, we amy have in Italy a ￿scal legal provision that is issued
with validity on one year at the end of that year, but the tax pay-
ment is ￿xed in the further year. When this law is abrogated, its
consequences in the future are prevented. However, if a temporary
law is issued after the ￿scal law with validity time in the past—a
retroactive decree is often used to integrate ￿scal laws in Italy—the
validity time of that decree can be extended to the consequences of
the ￿scal law, which is therefore somehow abrogated in the past,
but not in the future.
Furthermore, modi￿cations of legal validity have similar e￿ects
of abrogations. For instance, when we anticipate the end of the
validity of a law, we de facto abrogate it. Conversely, if two laws are
in con￿ict, and the con￿ict resolution is delegated to a temporary
law that suppresses the former law and issues the novel one, an
extension of the validity of the former law can revive a con￿ict and
thus generates an implicit abrogative e￿ect. This is a common case
of temporary laws.
Previous work [21] provided a detailed analysis of the reasons
that lead to the de￿nition of a model in which time is somehow ab-
stracted away. However, this is not the case for systems that include
temporary norms. Therefore we need to combine deadlines and the
date-issuing approach developed in the above mentioned paper. We
now present informal examples of the issues that can arise when
we want to modify rules that have a temporary nature. Example 1.1
refers to a temporary norm that is issued with an explicit deadline
that is modi￿ed further on, before its natural expiration date by
anticipating the deadline, whilst Example 1.2 refers to a temporary
norm that is modi￿ed by extending its expiration date.
Example 1.1. Every year, the national government in Italy issues
norms to cover urgent matters. The Italian name for this legislative
procedure is decretazione d’urgenza and the corresponding law is
called decreto legislativo. When such a decree is issued, the Ital-
ian Constitution allows the law to hold for a maximum of sixty
days. When the deadline is reached, the decree expires, unless the
parliament has converted it into a regular national legislative act.
Moreover, the parliament can cover it with a law that is issued with
the explicit intention of overwhelming the decree. These laws are
constantly opened with the act of anticipation for the deadline of
the decree they are issued in substitution of. The decree is therefore
suppressed in the date of issue of the new national law.
When this happens, usually this act of suppression cancels the norm
and its e￿ects onward without any form of survival for the e￿ects
of the norm itself. Further on we shall introduce a case in which
the suppression preserves the consequences that are derived in the
transitory phase. Clearly, government decrees are converted in na-
tional laws rather frequently. Very often the conversion occurs with
changes, namely suppression of parts and substitution of others,
and also obviously by introducing new parts. The conversion law
also contains a suppression act for the decree that anticipates its
expiration date. In Example 1.2 we analyse the inverse case.
Example 1.2. Regional governments in Italy have the power of
publishing calls for projects that have been promoted by the Eu-
ropean Union and distributed to the local authorities, in a fund
dissemination operation that is driven by national regulations. A
call for projects is a temporary norm, whose expiration date is ￿xed
when issued. Rather often, however, these calls do not attract a su￿-
cient number of admissible applications, and therefore, the calls are
extended, by moving forward the expiration date. Very naturally,
this extension preserves the consequences already in force at the
moment of the extension date.
As Example 1.2 clearly shows, an act of temporal extension, which
might look like a preservation act, is, in fact, an act of change that
can be assimilated to an abrogation, or an annulment. Basically,
there is in fact another transitory period (since the moment of the
extension of the natural deadline) where the norms were not in
force before the extension act, and should be enforced in one of
the two possible ways. In the example, the law can be suppressed
while allowing the subjects that have already applied to provide
new documents, or simply extending the deadline by allowing other
subjects to participate in the procedure.
In this paper, we address these issues using Defeasible Logic (DL)
[5, 33]. We shall provide, in Section 2, a brief overview of DL, we
refer to the model developed by Governatori and Rotolo [21] and
extend it with the notion of deadline to defeasible rules, similarly to
the logical system studied by Governatori et al. [13]. Speci￿cally, in
Section 2 we brie￿y recall some aspects of defeasible logic, and then
provide a sketch of temporal defeasible logic, and in Section 3 we
discuss some properties of these logics. Further on we introduce a
model of abrogation and annulment of norms that is also extended
to cover the cases in which we modify the deadlines of temporary
norms (temporal anticipation and temporal extension) in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 takes some conclusions and sketches future work.
2 OVERVIEW OF DEFEASIBLE LOGIC
DL is based on a logic programming-like language and it is a sim-
ple, e￿cient but ￿exible formalism dealing with many di￿erent
intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning. DL is closely related to
logic programming [6] and an argumentation semantics exists [14].
DL has a linear complexity [29] and also has several e￿cient im-
plementations [8]. In addition, some preliminary works on legal
modi￿cations in DL have been proposed [18, 19] and further devel-
oped in the recent past [16, 21].
A defeasible theoryD is a structure (F ,R, )where F is a ￿nite set
of facts, R a ￿nite set of rules, and   an acyclic superiority relation
on R. Facts are represented as literals and are indisputable state-
ments. A rule expresses a relationship between a set of premises
and a conclusion. Facts, premises and conclusions of a theory are
literals of a propositional logic, denoted by letters, pre￿xed or not
with ⇠ used to denote the negation. Rules can be strict, when they
connect premises to conclusions in a classical way (arrow!), de-
feasible rules (arrow)), when the conclusion is taken as plausible
and defeaters (arrow;) when the conclusion is considered blocked
by the premises.
The superiority relation ( ) provides information about the rel-
ative strength of rules, i.e., about which rules can overrule which
other rules. In this paper, we limit   to act only on those rules that
derive opposite conclusions.
Conclusions will be tagged by the defeasible proof tags +@B,
meaning that we have a defeasible proof for B and by  @B, meaning
that it is not possible to give a defeasible proof for B. Analogously,
± B means that we have (we have not) a strict proof for B (a proof
is strict i￿ only facts and strict rules are used).
Straightforwardly, where +@B holds, then  @B does not, and
 @⇠B does.
A derivation is a ￿nite sequence P = (P(1), . . . , P(n)) of tagged
literals satisfying four conditions, which correspond to inference
rules for each of the four kinds of conclusion. P(1..i) denotes the
initial part of the sequence P of length i .
Some notational conventions before presenting proof conditions
for DL derivations. Each rule is identi￿ed by a unique label. A(r )
denotes the set of antecedents of a rule r , while C(r ) denotes its
consequent. If R is a set of rules, R[B] denotes the set of rules in R
with consequent B. If B is a literal, ⇠B denotes the complementary
literal: if B is a positive literalC then ⇠B is ¬C ; and if B is ¬C , then
⇠B is C .
DL is a sceptical non-monotonic formalism: with a possible con-
￿ict between two conclusions, i.e., one is the negation of the other,
DL refrains to take a decision and we deem both as not provable
unless we have some more pieces of information that can be used
to solve the con￿ict. Within the limits of our formalisation, the
superiority relation is the only possible way to solve a con￿ict.
Defeasible proofs proceed in three phases: we ￿rst look for an
argument supporting the conclusion we want to prove (an appli-
cable rule for the conclusion). Second, we look for arguments for
the opposite of what we want to prove. Third, we rebut all the
counterarguments. This can be done by showing that the counter-
argument is not founded, i.e., some of the premises do not hold,
or by defeating the counterargument, i.e., the counterargument is
weaker than an argument for the conclusion we want to prove. We
introduce below the proof conditions for defeasible derivability. All
the formal de￿nitions can be found in [5].
+@: If P(i + 1) = +@B then either
(1) + B 2 P(1..i) or
(2.1) 9r 2 R[B]8A 2 A(r ) : +@A 2 P(1..i) and
(2.2)   ⇠B 2 P(1..i) and
(2.3) 8s 2 R[⇠B] either
(2.3.1) 9A 2 A(s) :  @A 2 P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) 9t 2 R[B] such that
8A 2 A(t) : +@A 2 P(1..i) and t   s .
3 REVISING DEFEASIBLE THEORIES
We brie￿y discuss in this section the problem of how to embed
in DL some ideas from belief and base revision in order to cap-
ture annulment, abrogation, extension and anticipation. This has
already been addressed, at ￿rst by Governatori and Rotolo [21, 35],
and further on, with speci￿c emphasis on superiority relation by
Governatori et al. [16].
We assume that a defeasible theory represents the basic logical
structure of a legal system [18, 19]. In legal systems, indeed, norm
conclusions can be obtained only if we do not have stronger norms
attacking them [37], compliant with the notions expressed in the
juridical principles of law superiority, as in lex superior, lex posterior,
lex anterior and lex specialis.
All the above mentioned approaches tend to adhere to the princi-
ples of the so-called AGM postulates, as expressed in [2]. However,
it has been widely discussed in the literature of non-monotonic
systems that important issues arise that cannot be dropped o￿with-
out negative consequences in the system itself. We here omit to
describe the treatment of these aspects for the sake of space, and
assume directly the notion of contraction and expansion of a DL.
Within the limits of our formalisation, the extension of a Defea-
sible Theory T is de￿ned as the pair E(T ) = (@+(T ), @ (T )), where
a literal B is either B 2 @+(T ) or ⇠B 2 (@ (T ). Accordingly, when a
literal is positively derived is B 2 @+(T ) and when it is negatively
derived, B 2 @ (T ). A contraction of a Defeasible TheoryT is a new
theoryT 0, whose extension is included in the extension ofT whilst
an expansion of T , on the contrary, is a theory whose extension
includes the extension of T .
As widely investigated by Governatori and Rotolo [21], revision
does not mimic how the law implements norm changes, since “new”
rules are generated to re￿ect the changes. An alternative to revision
based on belief sets is base revision [24, 32]. Base revision does
not operate on the extension of a theory, but rather applies to
the theory “generators”, i.e., the non-logical axioms of the theory.
This idea can be naturally coupled with partitioning the elements
of a theory into “facts” and “rules”, where the former cannot be
revised, unless update is used, while the latter may be subject to
revision. The fundamental idea of previous work on formalisms that
accommodate norm change [21] is to capture changes in terms of
base revision of a temporal defeasible logic, where temporal labels
are added onto literals of a defeasible theory in order to capture
two distinct types of rule temporalisation, namely transient and
persistent. A transient rule holds on a given temporal instant of the
timeline on which rules are issued whilst persistent rules hold since
the instant of issuing.
In this paper we provide a limited extension to the above men-
tioned formalism by adding a notion of rule deadline as provided by
Governatori et al. [13]. This is done by simply adding a new type
of rules, temporary rules, which are issued at a given instant, and
persist until a deadline. For the sake of space, we avoid to treat, in
this paper, the complex and extended issues of the legal systems
in their modi￿cation timeline, which was investigated in previous
work [21]. Determining consequences of the introduction of the
new rule type is matter of future work.
Governatori and Rotolo [21] suggest that the dynamics of a
legal system LS are more correctly captured by a time-series LS(t1),
LS(t2) , . . . ,LS(tj ) of its versions. Each version of LS is called a
norm repository [18, 19]. In other terms we can look at these rule
system as versions of the legal systems, in the same terms in which
versions are introduced in database literature.
The passage from one repository to another is e￿ected by legal
modi￿cations and by persistence [19], in themodels presented so far
in the literature. We introduce the possibility that a particular norm,
whose nature is temporary, reaches its deadline, and therefore that
the rule expires. Therefore, changes in legal systems can also occur
because of modi￿cations in the validity time of norms, or naturally
because of the expiration of a temporary norm.
As already shown in previous investigations, dynamics of norm
change and retroactivity need to introduce another time-line within
each version of LS .
By the above model, we can directly construct di￿erent forms
of modi￿cations. When rules do not possess a time deadline, that
is, they do not expire over the timeline of their validity, natural
operations are annulment and abrogation.When, instead, a deadline
is attached we have di￿erent conditions in the legal system.
One can argue that a simple approach to the solution of the prob-
lem of abrogation of temporary rules in a legal system can simply
consist in the same operation of base revision that is performed
for persistent rules. However, expiration has di￿erent e￿ects than
abrogation of persistent rules. The intent of someone who has pro-
vided a temporary rule is twofold. On one hand, she may have been
issuing the law because of a special temporary need, for instance
the situation of a natural disaster. In this case, the expiration of the
norm has a dramatic e￿ect, since persistence of its e￿ects would
be contrary to the will of the issuer. Therefore, we need to modify
the way in which modi￿cations are provided for persistent rules
in order to accommodate reversal for temporary e￿ects, only for
the validity-time interval that lasts from the instant in which the
abrogation takes place until the natural previous deadline of the
norm, for those e￿ects that would have been naturally extended on
the temporal axis for persistent rules, and preserve, in the repos-
itory, the complete cancellation of the e￿ects of the previously
existent temporary rule since its expiration forever. This introduces
two distinct ways of modifying the deadline of a temporary norm
backward and two forward ones:
• Backward abrogation is the operation of deleting the ef-
fects of a temporary norm retroactively with respect to its
natural expiration date. This can be viewed as a form of
strong anticipation of the deadline itself, which has a mixed
nature, for it is an abrogation of the future e￿ects, but also
of the previous ones, with respect to the deadline, therefore
sharing with annulment the nature of retroactivity;
• Forward annulment is the operation of annulling the norm
for its persistence in the instant in which the law is in force,
and further on, but without suppressing the e￿ects of the
norm for its persistence in the past of the moment in which
the act of suppression is issued. We can look at this as a
weak anticipation.
The general annulment operator consists in removing the rule since
the instant of the suppression act for all the e￿ects of the law, both
in the past and in the future.
Symmetrically, we can have dual e￿ects by the inverse operation
of extension. If we extend a norm, we may have the following:
• Forward abrogation is the operation of deleting the e￿ects
of a temporary norm in the future of a new deadline, moved
forward with respect to its natural expiration date. This
can be viewed as a form of weak extension of the deadline
itself, which has a mixed nature, for it is an annulment
of the transitory e￿ects, but not of the further ones, with
respect to the deadline;
• Backward annulment is the operation of moving forward
the norm expiration for its persistence without suppressing
the e￿ects of the norm for its persistence in the past of the
moment in which the act of suppression is issued. We can
look at this as a strong extension.
Again we have also abrogation, that consists in removing the rule
since the instant of the suppression act for all the future e￿ects of
the law.
4 A TWO-LAYERED FRAMEWORK FOR
NORM ISSUING AND SUPPRESSION
Previous work [21] presented some variants of temporal defeasible
logic (TDL) [20]. In the proposed formalism, a literal in the logic
has associated to it a timestamp at , meaning that a holds at time t .
Whenwe derive a conclusion this can be either persistent, namely
such that when it holds at the starting and ending point of an inter-
val then the conclusion itself holds in every instant of the interval
itself. When such a property does not hold, then the conclusion is
said to be transient.
Conversely, it is also possible to tag with temporal labels the
rules themselves. For instance, (r : ata ! btb )trmeans that the
rule r is in force at time tr , or in other words, we can use the
rule to derive the conclusion at time tr . The full semantics of this
expression appeared in [21]. The language of TDL is based on a
(numerable) set of atomic propositions Prop = {p,q, . . .}, a set of
rule labels {r1, r2, . . .}, a discrete totally ordered set of instants of
time T = {t1, t2, . . . }, the negation sign ¬, and the rule sign )
for defeasible rules and; for defeaters. A plain literal is either
an atomic proposition or the negation of it. Given a literal l with
⇠l we denote the complement of l , that is, if l is a positive literal
p then ⇠l = ¬p, and if l = ¬p then ⇠l = p. If l is a literal and t is
an instant of time, i.e., t 2 T , then lt is a temporalised literal. The
natural interpretation of a temporalised literal lt is that l is true
at time t . If lt is a temporalised literal and x 2 [1,1), then l (t,x )
is a duration literal. Again the natural interpretation of a duration
literal l (t,1) is that l holds at time t , but nothing is assumed upon l
afterwards (and also before). Conversely, when l (t,1) is concluded,
we assume that l holds in t and thereafter. Generally speaking, we
say that l (t,x ) is interpreted as l holds since t for x instants of time.
If l (t,x ) is a duration literal,   2 [1,1) t 0 2 T , then l (t,x )@(t 0, ) is
a fully temporalised literal, that, based on the durations x and   in
the literals, is interpreted as l is true at time t for x instants of time
in the repository in force at time t 0 onwards for   instants of time.
A rule is a relation between a set of premises, namely conditions
of applicability of the rule, and a conclusion. Admissible conclu-
sions are either literals or rules themselves building two classes of
rules:meta-rules and proper rules. Meta-rules describe the inference
mechanism of the institution on which norms are formalised, and
fundamentally implement the issuing and suppression principles of
the legal system.The intuition behind meta-rules is that meta-rules
yield the conditions to modify a legal system. A temporalised rule
is either an expression (r : ?)(t,x ) (the void rule) or (r : ;)(t,x )
(the empty rule) or (r : A) B)(t,x ), where r is a rule label, A is a
(possibly empty) set of temporalised literals,) is a rule sign, B is a
duration literal, t 2 T and x 2 [1,1).
On the above basis we extend duration literals to have also
expiration time, by means of the expression (r : A) B)(t,d ) with
the meaning for the rule to start being valid on t for d instants after
t . As a matter of fact, extended duration rules can incorporate basic
duration rules as formalised in previous work [21]: we can assume
1 as the minimum duration, corresponding to transient durations,
and a special symbol1 to represent inde￿nite durations.
Rather naturally, the only extended part of the system is the
rule duration. We do not actually need to extend literals, since
the representation of literals having transient symbolic duration is
su￿cient to capture any kind of needed literal at the layer used for
timeline where the rules apply.
In fact we have two temporal dimensions for norms in a nor-
mative system. The ￿rst dimension is when the norm is in force
in it, and the second is when the norm exists in the normative
system. We avoid, in this paper, to introduce the full formalism,
as it was discusses in previous work [21], and as should be devel-
oped henceforth. Basically, proper rules can be used to conclude
fully temporalised literals, whilst meta-rules have proper rules as
conclusions.
The basic formalism introduced here is an adaptation of Governa-
tori and Rotolo [21]’s system. A legal system is represented by a tem-
poralised defeasible theory, i.e. a structure (T , F ,Rnm,Rmeta,Rmod, 
) where T is a totally ordered discrete set of time points, F is a
￿nite set of facts, i.e., fully temporalised literals, Rnm is a ￿nite set
of unmodi￿able rules, Rmeta is a ￿nite set of meta rules, Rmod is a
￿nite set of proper rules, and  , the superiority relation over rules
is formally de￿ned as T 7! (T 7! Rules ⇥ Rules).
An unmodi￿able rule is a rule such that 8t , t 0, t 00, t 000 r t@t 0 =
r t
00@t 000.
Basically, the derivation in TDL is a ￿nite sequence of tagged
expressions such that:
(1) Each expression is either a temporalised rule or a tempo-
ralised literal;
(2) Each tag is one of the following: +@t@t 0,  @t@t 0;
(3) The proof conditions “defeasible rule provability” and “de-
feasible literal provability” given below are satis￿ed by the
sequence P .
In particular:
Defeasible Rule Provability
If P(n + 1) = +@td@tr r t  , then
1.1) r t 0 @t 0r 2 Rmod or
9sts 2 Rmeta[r t 0  ] : 8ata 2 A(s),+@t 0d@t 00r ata 2 P[1..n] and
1.2) 8mtm 2 R[⇠r t  ] either
.1) 9btb 2 A(m) :  @t 00d @t 000r btb 2 P[1..n] or
.2)mtm  trtd r tr , if r t
0
 @t 0r 2 Rmod or
mtm  trtd sts , if r t
0
 @t 0r < Rmod or
.3) 9wtw 2 R[r t 00  ] : 8ctc 2 A(w),+@t 000d @t 0000r ctc 2 P[1..n] and
mtm  trtd wtw
where
(1) if r is persistent, then t 0   t  ; if r is transient, then t  = t 0  ;
(2) if ata , (resp. btb , ctc ) is persistent within the repository at
tr , then t 0d  td (resp. t 00d  td , t 000d  td ); if ata (resp. btb ,
ctc ) is transient within the repository at tr , then t 0d = td )
(resp. t 00d = td , t
000
d = td );
(3) if ata ’s, btb ’s and ctc ’s are persistent with respect to repos-
itories (i.e., conclusions are persistent), then t 00r , t 000r , t 0000r 
tr ; otherwise t 00r , t 000r , t 0000r = tr
(4) if r t 0  and s (i.e., facts, rules, and meta-rules) are persistent
with respect to repositories, then t 0r  tr ; otherwise t 0r = tr .
Temporary laws, namely, rules with de￿nite duration, are treated
as if they were persistent with respect to a number of repositories
equal to the duration. Therefore we have that if ata (resp. btb , ctc )
is persistent in the repository at tr , and in any repository at t , with
tr < t < tr + d , then t 0d  td (resp. t 00d  td , t 000d  td ).
Defeasible Literal Provability
The proof conditions for persistent and transient rules and literals
in systems without temporary laws are fully provided in [21]. We
report below the versions adopted for the same logical system.
Below, +@td@tr ptp 2 P[1..n] represents only temporalised facts.
If P(n + 1) = +@td@tr ptp , then
1.1) r t 0 @tr , ;, r t 0 @t 0r 2 R[pt
0
p ], +@t 0d@t 0r r t
0
  2 P[1..n] and
8ata 2 A(r ) , +@t 0d@t 0r ata 2 P[1..n], and
1.2) 8sts 2 R[⇠pt⇠p ] if +@t 00d @t 00r st
0
s 2 P[1..n], then either
.1) 9btb 2 A(s), @t 00d @t 00r btb 2 P[1..n] or
.2) 9wtw 2 R[pt 00p ] such that +@t 00d @t 00r wtw 2 P[1..n] and8ctc 2 A(w),+@t 00d @t 00r ctc 2 P[1..n] and sts  trtd wtw .
where
(1) if p is persistent, t 0p  t⇠p  tp , otherwise t 0p = t⇠p = tp ;
(2) t 0s  t  , if s is persistent, otherwise ts = t 0s = t  ;
(3) td  t 0s , if s is persistent, otherwise ts = t 0s = td ;
(4) if conclusions are persistent over derivations
(i.e., +@t 0d@trp
pt implies +@td@trppt where
t 0d < td ), t
0
d  t 00d  td ; otherwise t 0d = t 00d = td ;
(5) if conclusions are persistent over repositories,
t 0r  t 00r  tr ; otherwise t 0r = t 00r = tr .
We can distinguish two relevant properties: rule persistence and
causal conclusion persistence. Usually, norms persist in a speci￿c
version of a legal system unless the norm is abrogated, annulled or
expires.
We now provide examples of the di￿erent ways in which the ab-
rogation and the annulment of temporary norms can a￿ect the
version of a legal system. Example 4.1 shows what happens when
a temporary norm that is in force at a legal system is suppressed
by an act of annulment.
Example 4.1. This is a ￿ctional, but realistic example. Consider
the case in which a government issues a temporary law that lasts,
as happens in Italy, for sixty days. This temporary law suspends,
for the period of validity, any obligation to pay the interests on the
￿nes received in the year before. The procedure to obtain the privi-
lege consists in making an online application and then waiting for a
period of thirty days without a negative answer, based on a method
that is called silenzio-assenso, namely silent-consent. During the
validity period of the law several citizens apply for the privilege,
but before the deadline of sixty days the decree is declared unconsti-
tutional by the Constitutional Court, and therefore suppressed with
an act of annulment. Obviously the annulment a￿ects both those
who applied and has received no negative answer being therefore
able to use the privilege, which is however null, by the decision of
the court, and, even more naturally those who applied but are still
within the temporal horizon established in the decree.
The idea underlying the model of norm change developed in the
literature [21], which we employ here and extend to cover the case
of temporary norms, consists in a rule that can either be causal,
namely such that it persists in further versions of a legal system, or
not. The annulment of a norm simply consists in removing from
the system the rule, or better, in transforming it into the empty rule.
Furthermore, when a norm is abrogated, it is converted into a causal
rule and then annulled. In this way, we obtain that the consequences
of the rule persist over time in the future of the abrogation time,
whilst the rule per se does not exist anymore.
Operations of temporal anticipation and temporal extension mod-
ify the expiration date. For the purposes of this paper we do not
consider other modi￿cation operations that change the temporal
extension of a temporary norms, and in one case, also persistent
rules. This consists in changing the starting time of a rule, an oper-
ation usually named a postposition. For the purposes of this paper,
as it will be clari￿ed in the de￿nition of the operations themselves,
in Section 5, temporal anticipation and temporal extension are
performed only before the expiration time of a temporary norm.
Analogously, a postposition can be performed only before the start-
ing time of a norm, independently of the rule being persistent or
temporary.
5 ANTICIPATIONS AND EXTENSIONS IN TDL
In this sectionwe recall themethods adopted in [21] to cancel norms
in TDL by means of annulment and abrogation operators. Both
modi￿cations cancel norms from a legal system, but in completely
di￿erent ways and mainly for completely di￿erent reasons and
purposes. Let LS(t 0) be the repository containing a modi￿able rule
(r : A ) B)(t  ,1) such that t 0 < t  < t 00, and LS(t 00) be the
subsequent repository where we apply the modi￿cation of r , which
is e￿ective from a certain time ta . Then LS(t 00) will contain (r :
;)(ta,1). This makes the previous version of r inapplicable in LS(t 00)
from ta , and so, there, we no longer obtain B using r :1 condition
(2.1) for Defeasible Literal Provability states that (r : A ,! B)
is applicable if it is provable with that content, but this does not
1We reason only on the repository time and time of force. B will also have a tempo-
ral parameter and, if persistent, will hold from then onwards. We assume that B is
persistent and its time is slightly after ta .
hold after the modi￿cation (see condition (2.2) for Defeasible Rule
Provability).
Although this seems to be a general solution to all problems
arising with modi￿cation of norms forward, it does not deal with
the basics of backward modi￿cations. In particular, there is a fun-
damental di￿erence between annulment and abrogation that sites
upon the nature of the e￿ect lock. In other terms conclusions of
annulled rule are only derived in the repository in which the modi￿-
cation does not occur (see Figure 1(b)). This has been anticipated by
Governatori et al. [19] and technically solved by the introduction
of the operations of annulment and abrogation [21].
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate the approach to abrogation and
annulment in TDL employed here. The solution proposed by Gover-
t0
t0 t0
t 0 t 00 t 0 t 00
t 0
LS (t 0)
t 00
LS (t 00)
r t  @t 0 abrog(r )ta@t 00
t  t  ta
r r
+@B +@B
(a) Abrogation. In LS (t 0) rule r pro-
duces a persistent e￿ect B . B carries
over by persistence to LS (t 00) even if r
is no longer in force.
t0
t0 t0
t 0 t 00 t 0 t 00
t 0
LS (t 0)
t 00
LS (t 00)
r t  @t 0 annul(r )ta@t 00
t  t  ta
r r
+@B
(b) Annulment. In LS (t 0) rule r is ap-
plied and produces a persistent e￿ect
B . Since r is annulled in LS (t 00), B
must be undone as well.
Figure 1: Abrogation and Annulment
natori and Rotolo [21] is as follows. Let the positive defeasible exten-
sion of a theory T be the set E+@(T ) = {ptp@t |T ` +@#t 0@tptp }.
The abrogation of a rule r at ta in repository t 0is de￿ned as
follows:
T abr (ta,t
0)
r =
(
T if r < E+@(T )
(F ,R0, ) otherwise (1)
where R0 = R [ {(abrr : ) (r : ?)(ta,1))@(t 0,1)}, where t 0 > t .
The abrogation simply terminates the applicability of the rule.
If we assume no persistency over repositories, the machinery
that treats the annulment of persistent norms is rather simple, and
consists in the following:
T ann-tran(ta,t
0)
r =
(
T if r < E+@(T )
(F ,R0, ) otherwise (2)
where R0 = R [ {(mr : ) (r : ;)(ta,1))@(t 0,1)} Thus to annul
at ta the rule r tr@t we introduce a meta-rule whose conclusion is
the empty rule. Though apparently tricky this approach eliminates
the rule from the system, but simultaneously solves the problem
of persistency of the e￿ects over time, which should be prevented.
The above, however, does not apply directly when the persistency
over repositories is permitted. In particular, given a set of duration
literalsD, a set of temporalised literalsT and a total discrete ordered
(T , <), we de￿ne
D \(T,<) T = {lt 2 T |9l (t 0,x ) 2 D : t 0 = t if x = 1,
and t  t 0 otherwise}
For the sake of simplicity in the de￿nition below the rules are
the conclusion of a meta-rule (each with a unique name), thus the
expression (r : a1, . . . ,an ) btb )tr@t represents the abbreviation
of the meta-rule (with empty body) (mr : ) (r : a1, . . . ,an )
btb )tr )@t . For a literal l , ann(l) is a new literal not occurring in
that theory.
Given a duration literal b(t,x ) (where x is either 0 or 1, and a
theoryT , we de￿ne the dependence set, i.e., the set of literals (called
critical literals) potentially depending on it, as follows:
Dep(b(t,x )) = {b(t,x )} [ {c(tc ,xc ) |9r 2 R : C(s) = c(tc ,xc )^
A(r ) \(T,<) Dep(b(t,x )) , ;}
Then, if the annulment applies at ta in repository t 0
T annul (ta,t
0)
(r :a1, ...,an)b (tb ,x ))tr @t =
(
T if r < E+@(T )
(F ,R0, 0) otherwise (3)
where
R0 = R [ {(r : ;)(ta,1)@(t 0,1),
(r⇠ :) ⇠b(tb ,x ))(ta,1)@(t 0, 1),
(rann :) ann(b)(tb ,x ))(ta,1)@(t 0, 1)}
[ {(sr ep : A(s)   Dep(C(r ))[
{ann(a)ta |a 2 A(s) \(T,<) Dep(C(r ))} )
ann(C(s))(ta,1))(ta,1)@(t 0, 1),
(sann :ann(C(s))ta ) ⇠C(r ))(ta,1)@(t 0, 1)|
if A(s) \(T,<) Dep(C(r )) , ;}
[ {(snan :A(s) ) ⇠ann(C(r ))(ta,1))(ta,1)@(t 0, 1)|
if C(s) 2 Dep(C(r )) ^A(r ) \(T,<) Dep(C(r )) = ;}
 0=  [{(t 0, ta , r r ep , r )|r 2 R} [ {(t 0, ta , rnan , sann )|r , s 2 R}
The idea is to replace a rule with a a new one that has been
obtained as follows:
• For every rule where literals depending on the conclusion
of the rule to be annulled occur in the antecedent, we create
a copy of the rule where all critical literals are replaced by
auxiliary literals.
• Moreover, for each critical literal its auxiliary literal is the
body of a defeater for the complement of the critical literal.
• Finally, for each rule for a critical literal di￿erent from
the conclusion of the rule to be annulled where no critical
literal appears in the antecedent, we create a defeasible
rule with the same body and as conclusion the complement
of the critical literal.
The operations of abrogations and annulments apply to temporary
laws in the same way in which they apply to persistent rules, but on
the basis of the generation of auxiliary objects that are temporary
rules. In particular, abrogation operations are de￿ned as follows.
Forward abrogation
T [d 0]f abr (ta,t 0)(r :a1, ...,an)b (tb ,d ))tr @t =
(
T if r < E+@(T )
(F ,R0, 0) otherwise (4)
• We generate two new temporary rules, r 0 and r 00. r 0 is the
extension of r (obtained by applying the extension oper-
ator), and r 00 is the same rule but starting in the deadline
time of r and ending in the deadline time of r 0. Further
on, we abrogate r 00, and build a superiority relation be-
tween the empty rule used to substitute r 00 and r 0 in the
repositories between the deadline of r and the deadline of
r 0.
In order to illustrate how the introduced method works, we for-
malise here the forward abrogation.
Example 5.1. Consider a law that is issued on the ￿rst of Decem-
ber 2015, and supposed to hold since January 2016 until the end of
June 2016, which introduces a ￿shing licence for ponds. The law
allows citizens to ￿sh without licence until the deadline, provided
that they obtain a licence by that date, otherwise they will get
￿ned. By the end of May 2016, due to ine￿ciency in licence issuing,
the government issues an extension that postpones the e￿ects of
the law, thus allowing the citizens to ￿sh without a licence until
July 2016, but without changing the deadline for application for
licences. We represent the law original issue in the formalism as
r (1/1/2016,6months)@(1/12/2015, 7months). A forward abrogation
consists of the following steps:
• Generate, by the extension operator, a new rule
r 0(1/1/2016,7months)@(31/5/2016, 2months) and a new rule
r 00(1/7/2016,1month)@(31/5/2016, 2months);
• We abrogate r 00 and substitute it with the empty rule (r 000 :
;)(1/7/2016,1month);
• We establish (r 00   r 0)@(1/6/2016, 1month).
Backward abrogation
T [d 0]babr (ta,t 0)(r :a1, ...,an)b (tb ,d ))tr @t =
(
T if r < E+@(T )
(F ,R0, 0) otherwise (5)
• We generate two new temporary rules, r 0 and r 00. r 0 is
the anticipation of r , obtained by applying the anticipa-
tion operator, and r 00 is the same rule but starting in the
deadline time of r and ending in the deadline time of r 0.
Further on, we abrogate r 00, and build a superiority relation
between the empty rule used to substitute r 00 and r 0 in the
repositories between the deadline of r 0 and the deadline of
r .
Moreover, anticipations and extensions can occur only for rules
that are in force at the moment of the operation, and therefore,
are done within the same repository. The basic idea of an anticipa-
tion/extension is that a rule is operated on the one hand by
T [d 0]anticipate(ta,t 0)(r :a1, ...,an)b (tb ,d ))tr @t
that changes the duration d to (d + d 0), whilst, on the other hand,
[T [d 0]extend (ta,t 0)(r :a1, ...,an)b (tb ,d ))tr @t
that changes the duration d to (d   d 0). Without speci￿cation of
what to do with anticipated e￿ects (when extending) and with
eliminated future e￿ects (when anticipating) we can assume that
these operators act in a given way, chosen as default; we prefer
to provide distinct de￿nitions for the combinatorial four models.
The de￿nition of the methods used to perform the operation are
given out in an informal way since the notation is cumbersome.
Moreover these correspond to operations on the basic rules gener-
ated by the abrogation and annulment rules. Regarding annulment,
the structure is almost identical to the extensions provided by the
abrogation operations.
Forward annulment
T [d 0]f annul (ta,t 0)(r :a1, ...,an)b (tb ,d ))tr @t =
(
T if r < E+@(T )
(F ,R0, 0) otherwise (6)
• We generate two new temporary rules, r 0 and r 00. r 0 is the
extension of r , obtained by applying the extension operator,
and r 00 is the same rule but starting in the deadline time of r
and ending in the deadline time of r 0. Further on, we annul
r 00, and build a superiority relation between the empty rule
used to substitute r 00 and r 0 in the repositories between
the deadline of r and the deadline of r 0.
Backward annulment
T [d 0]bannul (ta,t 0)(r :a1, ...,an)b (tb ,d ))tr @t =
(
T if r < E+@(T )
(F ,R0, 0) otherwise (7)
• We generate two new temporary rules, r 0 and r 00. r 0 is the
anticipation of r obtained by applying the anticipation op-
erator), and r 00 is the same rule but starting in the deadline
time of r 0 and ending in the deadline time of r . Further on,
we annul r 00, and build a superiority relation between the
empty rule used to substitute r 00 and r 0 in the repositories
between the deadline of r 0 and the deadline of r .
To cover the cases with examples, Example 1.1 is a backward abro-
gation, whilst Example 1.2 is a forward annulment. Examples 5.2
and Example 5.3 cover the other two cases.
Example 5.2. A government decree is issued that allows com-
panies to subtract a ￿xed amount to their monthly tax payments
for three months, when the company has declared the need to do
so in the ￿rst month of the decree. After two months the decree
deadline is postponed of three further months. Clearly, the exten-
sion allows the companies that have presented the declaration of
necessity state to use the norm, and does not allow further requests,
as the previously established date has already expired.
Example 5.3. In recruiting acts of the American Government, it
is established a term for applications for a position. The expiration
date of applications can be anticipated only if the position is ￿lled
in advance. In this case, the anticipation is hard. for it prevents to
derive conclusions from the moment of issues onward.
We can now prove a few results regarding the ways in which we
can map anticipations and extensions in the basic norm change
setting of TDL. The ￿rst result shows that temporary rules can be
accommodated into the system presented in [21]. In particular, in
the claim of the theorems below, we name direct consequence of a
rule the set of all literals that cannot be derived in the repository in
which the rule is applied without assuming those literals or a set of
other literals and the rule itself.
To accommodate temporary norms in our system we can simply
abrogate them at the expiration date. A system like the one we
present in this paper is named TDL-T, for it is a TDL with temporary
norms, whilst a systemwith temporal features along with defeasible
machinery is named a TDL system.
T￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5.4. Every TDL-T system T can be translated determin-
istically into a TDL systemT 0 in linear time on the number of literals.
The proof of the claim of Theorem 5.4 consists in showing that a
temporary rule can be substituted by the rule itself made persistent
on the repository corresponding to the issue, and, if the system has
this property, it is persistent over repositories (or an abrogation
operation executed at the expiration date, i.e, that takes place at
the expiration date, but is programmed synchronously with the
norm issuing time). The number of repositories involved in this
process amount at a maximum of elements that can be the number
of admissible changes. The admissible changes involve at most once,
all the literals. Therefore the translation is linear in the number of
literals.
Moreover, we need to know whether the revision process that
is performed against persistent rules can be also applied to com-
binations of temporary rules. We are now ready to claim the two
projection results for temporary rules.
T￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5.5. Forward annulment and backward abrogation of a
temporary rule in a TDL-T system T are meta-rule revision for the
corresponding TDL system.
T￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5.6. Forward abrogation and backward annulment of a
temporary rule in a TDL-T system T are rule revision for the corre-
sponding TDL system.
More precisely, we can provide these basic operations in a TDL
system, namely the contraction and expansion of a rule (or a meta-
rule), only for those rules and meta-rules that have been generated
to provide the mapping from a TDL-T system onto a TDL system.
On the contrary, it is clear that this is a very unreasonable way of
acting in general, as it may cause modi￿cation that are not codi￿ed.
As a matter of fact, Governatori and Rotolo [21] prevented the
consequences of such problematic revisions by assuming that rules
can be transformed by substituting them with the empty rule or the
void rule, as discussed above. When doing so with an abrogation act
included in the law, we need to deal with the representation of the
act as a meta-rule, which is not possible in an explicit way in TDL.
Thus the representation issues are covered, but the modi￿cation
needs to be articulated completely, and in an explicit way.
We can suppress the direct consequences in the interval be-
tween the expiration date before the revision and the expiration
date after the revision, and we do not suppress them afterwards.
These di￿erences in the operators map the notions of backward
and forward abrogations, for suppression of the norm and not of
the consequences in the intervals above de￿ned, whilst if we sup-
press the norm along with its consequences in the interval we have
annulments.
It is rather evident that in this way we have still avoided the
temporal reasoning issues, and that we preserved the codi￿ed op-
erations. If we assume that the generalisation process has been
performed on the same domain of the rules and metarules, we have
the following (negative) result.
T￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5.7. TDL systems with rule and meta-rule revision can
work with any system of meta-rules de￿ned a priori.
Theorem 5.7 means that when we choose a prede￿ned meta-rule
system we can always accommodate it in a TDL system. However
to force this to work we need revision. If we assume to codify
correctly the behaviour of meta-rules as means to modify the law,
we then have this consequence: only codi￿ed behaviours actually
work, in such a system, as we cannot modify the rules and meta-
rules freely. Is there any possible structural negative e￿ect of this
di￿erent choice, which could be assumed to be a further reason to
choose codi￿ed changes? We can prove the following result.
T￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5.8. Given a legal system version LS(i), and a legal
system version LS(i+1), there exists a set of rules and meta-rules with
base revision operators that brings the system from LS(i) to LS(i+1).
Combined with Theorem 5.7, the result of Theorem 5.8 has to be
interpreted as follows: the codi￿cation of norm changes is necessary
for it restricts the ways that are allowed to change the law in a
speci￿c legal system.
Conclusively, the choice of extending with the temporary rules
the system introduced by Governatori and Rotolo [21] is justi￿ed
by the need for systems able to remain stable over time, whilst pre-
serving general principles of a legal system and permitting codi￿ed
changes in the system itself. The hypothesis of accommodating
non-codi￿ed changes within a system is clearly non-practical. Fur-
thermore, we are strongly interested in understanding the complex-
ity of the reasoning processes in these systems. We should mention
that the complexity of general reasoning within the Governatori
and Rotolo’s framework has not yet been investigated. Theorem
5.4 proves, however, that the decidability condition and the compu-
tational complexity of the decision processes for annulment and
abrogation operators on temporary laws fully depend on the cor-
responding conditions on the general operators of annulment and
abrogation, due to the linearity of the translation process.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHERWORK
In this paper we extended a model of legal abrogations and annul-
ments in Defeasible Logic adding similar operations acting on tem-
porary norms. A temporary norm is a norm that has a pre-de￿ned
expiration time. Above the possibility of changing a norm by an-
nulment or abrogation, it is also possible to modify a temporary
norm by anticipating or extending its expiration time. Although
it is rather intuitive that an operation of anticipation shares the
majority of its properties with abrogation, it is not evident that
something similar also happens when we change a norm by mov-
ing forward its expiration date. We argue, in particular, that there
are two distinct ways of moving backward and two of moving for-
ward the expiration date of a norm, which consist in suppressing
the norm (when anticipating) with all the future consequences of
the norm locked onward, or retaining the original expiration time
for norm lock and the anticipation date for the sole consequences.
Moreover, as it happens for instance for tax law, the parliament
forces the value limits for the future of a given moment, but when
anticipates an expiration date of a temporary norm usually acts
on favour of citizens, then preserving the past norm for everyone.
On the other way around, if we move the law expiration date for-
ward, we move on the expiration date the consequences but not the
norm per se, obtaining di￿erent e￿ects when we suppress norm
and consequences only at the new expiration date.
We showed that the framework of Governatori and Rotolo [21]
accommodates also changes to temporary norms, de￿ned in an
extension of the framework itself. We also showed that the oper-
ations of annulment and abrogation can be used to describe the
process of re-positioning the expiration date of temporary norms,
but when this is done, the proposed new framework requires a
temporal reasoning machinery, that is very undesirable with the
defeasible non-monotonic reasoning framework, since simple poly-
nomial machineries can become exponential, and the corresponding
computational complexity can devise NP Problems. The process of
transformation that is employed to map temporary norm changes
onto the Governatori and Rotolo’s framework, is linear, and the
decision is therefore computable. On top of this, the changing meta-
rules are overwhelmed if we accept changes to the rules based on
the extension to annulment and abrogation techniques previously
introduced. This is also a validation of the approach of previous
work [21] in the speci￿c case of temporary norms.
Many aspects of the changes to temporary norms have not been
yet dealt with. On the one hand, the study of temporary norms
should also be extended to delegated legislation and to the corre-
sponding issues related to institutional power against that legis-
lation. For instance, when a government decree is issued, in Italy,
it expires sixty days after the issuing date. During this period of
time, the parliament can convert the decree into a national law,
essentially transforming a temporary norm into a persistent one.
An open issue is the comparison to other formal approaches to
change, as, e.g., in the studies about revocation of permissions [11].
This investigation has dealt with problems like the persistency of
e￿ects of decisions made by persons who left a job after di￿erent
events, like resignment, retirement, or ￿ring. Di￿erent ways of
ceasing being part of an organisation can have di￿erent e￿ects.
We are taking further this study in two directions. One is the
analysis of decidability and complexity issues related to the formal-
ism. In fact, no study has been carried out yet on the decidability
of the general framework introduce by Governatori and Rotolo
[21], and the computational properties of the extension presented
here fully depend on these properties. A general framework based
on TDL is under preparation, which aims at accommodating an
exhaustive classi￿cation of the possible ways in which a normative
system can change over time.
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